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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises out of an ERISA action brought by 
Thomas H. Taylor, a former employee of Peoples Natural Gas 
Company ("PNG"), against the members of the Annuities and 
Benefits Committee ("the defendants"), which is the plan 
administrator of PNG's pension plan.  The district court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants.  The gravamen of Taylor's 
claim is that statements regarding the retroactivity of the 
pension plan's early retirement incentive program, made to him by 
PNG's Supervisor of Employee Benefits, John Burgunder, who was 
not a member of the Annuities and Benefits Committee, constituted 
  
a breach of the defendants' fiduciary obligation to communicate 
complete and correct material information to plan participants 
regarding their status and options under an employee benefit 
plan.  The Equal Employment Advisory Council has filed an amicus 
curiae brief in support of the defendants.   
 Because Burgunder's statements form the basis of 
Taylor's suit against the defendants and Taylor has not sued 
Burgunder, we first, as a matter of logic, address the important 
question presented -- whether a plan administrator is liable for 
statements made by individuals who have been selected as non-
fiduciary agents by the plan administrator to assist it in 
discharging its fiduciary obligation to administer a plan, even 
though such individuals are formally employees of the plan 
sponsor, who is not a fiduciary.  We answer this question in the 
affirmative, and conclude that the defendants are responsible for 
any material misstatements made by Burgunder to Taylor regarding 
possible changes in PNG's pension plan since, in counseling 
Taylor, Burgunder was acting, at a minimum, within his apparent 
authority as an agent of the defendants.  We will, however, 
affirm the judgment because the statements allegedly made by 
Burgunder do not, as a matter of law, constitute a 
misrepresentation of a material fact.   
 I.   
 PNG sponsors a pension plan along with its parent 
corporation, Consolidated Natural Gas Company ("CNG").  The named 
fiduciary and plan administrator of the pension plan is the 
Annuities and Benefits Committee, which is made up of employees 
  
of both CNG and PNG.  The members of this committee are the 
relevant defendants in this action.1  Burgunder was not a member 
of the Annuities and Benefits Committee. 
 During 1988, PNG hired several outside consulting firms 
to conduct efficiency studies to examine ways to decrease costs 
and increase the efficiency of the company's operations.  In 
connection with these studies, PNG considered several downsizing 
options, including the offer of an early retirement incentive 
program through the company's pension plan.  Taylor, who was 
employed during this period as a general manager in PNG's 
Information System department, participated in the efficiency 
studies and submitted a report to his boss, Scotty Amos, in which 
he concluded that, if certain changes were implemented, Taylor's  
department could operate with six fewer employees.  In his report 
                     
     
1
 Taylor also has brought a claim against PNG, alleging a 
breach of its fiduciary obligations under ERISA.  The Magistrate 
Judge granted PNG's motion for summary judgment on this claim, 
concluding that, under the circumstances, PNG was not subject, in 
its capacity as plan sponsor, to ERISA's fiduciary obligations.  
We agree.  While "ERISA allows employers to wear two hats" and 
act both as plan sponsor and plan administrator, an employer can 
elect to wear only its plan sponsor "hat" and may designate, 
pursuant to ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (1985), a 
separate entity as plan administrator.  Fischer v. Philadelphia 
Electric Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. 
Ct. 622 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  PNG has made 
such an election and has designated the Annuities and Benefits 
Committee as plan administrator.  Given this election, PNG is not 
subject, in its capacity as employer/plan sponsor, to ERISA's 
fiduciary obligations.  See id., 994 F.2d at 133 ("As an 
employer, neither [the plan sponsor] nor its business decision to 
offer an early retirement program were subject to ERISA's 
fiduciary duties.").  Thus, Taylor's claim of fiduciary breach is 
properly limited in this case to the plan administrator, the 
Annuities and Benefits Committee. 
  
Taylor suggested an early retirement incentive plan as a possible 
method to reduce his department's manpower.  During the latter 
portion of 1988, Taylor, who started work at PNG in 1959, began 
to consider retirement, while he was aware that PNG was, 
consistent with his suggestion, considering an early retirement 
incentive program as a downsizing option. 
 During the first two months of 1989, Taylor spoke to 
Burgunder about whether PNG would adopt an early retirement 
incentive program and, if such a plan were enacted, whether it 
would be made retroactive to encompass employees retiring before 
the announcement of the program.  While, as we have noted, 
Burgunder was not a member of the Annuities and Benefits 
Committee, the defendants concede that he was authorized "to 
advise employees of their rights and options under the Pension 
Plan." Appellees Br. at 21.  Moreover, it was generally 
understood by PNG employees that Burgunder was the person with 
whom plan participants should speak regarding possible changes to 
the pension plan.  Taylor represents that during one particular 
discussion, Burgunder told him that he believed that, should an 
early retirement program be offered, it might apply 
retroactively.  More specifically, Taylor stated: 
 During and prior to the March 1st date I had 
had discussions with Mr. Burgunder relative 
to rumors and possible studies that may have 
been going on that could lead to an early 
retirement program, and it was during one of 
those discussion points where I talked with 
Mr. Burgunder about other people that were 
retiring, and he gave me the -- he told me at 
that time that he believed that if there 
would be any early retirement programs 
offered in 1989, that they would make it 
  
retroactive to people retired from January 
1st, until such time as they might offer the 
program. 
 
App. at 8b-9b.  Taylor continued: 
  
 I can't recall exactly what his conversations 
were about the retroactivity other than he 
believed that if an early retirement program 
was announced or it was offered -- that might 
be a better word -- it might be retroactive 
to these people that we were talking about. 
 
App. at 33b.   
 Following these conversations, on November 30, 1988,   
Taylor tendered a written announcement of his intention to 
retire: 
 Please accept my request for permission to 
retire from active employment effective March 
1, 1989. . . . I would also like to change my 
retirement date should a special retirement 
package be proposed or planned on or before 
3-1-89. 
 
App. at 34a.  Taylor in fact retired on March 1, 1989.  On August 
10, roughly five months later, the Annuities and Benefits 
Committee announced that an early retirement program had been 
adopted by PNG's Board of Directors and would be available for 
employees retiring between September 1, 1989 and November 1, 
1989.  This program was not made retroactive to employees -- such 
as Taylor -- retiring prior to September 1, 1989.   
 Following this announcement, Taylor brought suit 
against the plan administrator contending that the statements 
made to him by Burgunder regarding the possible retroactive 
application of the early retirement program constituted a 
  
misrepresentation by an ERISA plan fiduciary.  The parties 
consented to have this case adjudicated by a Magistrate Judge, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 636(c) (1993), who concluded that the statements made 
by Burgunder to Taylor did not constitute a misrepresentation, 
and hence the defendants had not breached their fiduciary 
obligation.  He therefore granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
   On this appeal of the Magistrate Judge's order, 
authorized by 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(3) (1993), the defendants ask 
us to affirm on the ground that Burgunder was not acting on 
behalf of the plan administrator when speaking with Taylor about 
possible changes in the pension plan or, alternatively, on the 
basis of the Magistrate Judge's reasoning that there was no 
misrepresentation as a matter of law.  In reviewing an order 
granting summary judgment we exercise plenary review, applying 
the same standard that governed the district court.  That 
standard provides that summary judgment should be rendered if the 
evidence is such that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 
  II.  
 A. 
 The members of the Annuities and Benefits Committee, 
the plan administrator of PNG's pension plan, are fiduciaries, 
required to "discharge [their] duties with respect to [the] plan 
  
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."2  
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (1986).  We addressed 
the scope of this fiduciary obligation under a similar set of 
circumstances in Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 994 F.2d 
at 130.  There, employees of the Philadelphia Electric Company 
("PECO") had approached PECO's benefits counselors and questioned 
them about whether any early retirement incentive plan was being 
considered.  Although PECO was considering an early retirement 
incentive plan, the benefits counselors, acting pursuant to 
explicit instructions from PECO's senior management, informed the 
plan participants that they had no knowledge of any such plan.  
The plaintiffs, plan participants who retired before the 
announcement of the early retirement incentive pension plan, 
alleged that PECO had breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA 
by making affirmative material misrepresentations regarding 
PECO's pension plan.  The action against PECO was grounded on its 
alleged violation of fiduciary obligations in its capacity as 
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  As noted above, the members of the Annuities and Benefits 
Committee are the relevant defendants in this action, and Taylor 
has alleged a fiduciary breach on the part of that Committee for 
statements made by Burgunder, PNG's Supervisor of Employee 
Benefits.  It is therefore necessary to analyze accurately under 
appropriate legal doctrine Taylor's appeal of the magistrate 
judge's dismissal of this action.  We acknowledge that Taylor has 
also alleged a fiduciary breach on the part of PNG, a claim upon 
which the magistrate judge chose to focus in his memorandum 
opinion and which this court has disposed of in note 1.  The 
disposition of this claim does not, however, obviate the need to 
properly address Taylor's parallel claim of fiduciary breach on 
the part of the Annuities and Benefits Committee. 
 
 
  
plan administrator.3  The district court granted summary judgment 
for PECO and the plaintiffs appealed. 
 The Fischer panel began its analysis by recognizing 
that well established case law provides that plan administrators 
have a fiduciary obligation not to affirmatively misrepresent 
material facts to plan participants.  Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135 
(citing Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) ("This duty to communicate complete and correct 
material information about a beneficiary's status and options is 
not a novel idea.")); see also Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters 
Health-Welfare Program, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(recognizing that plan administrators have "an obligation to 
convey complete and accurate information material to the 
beneficiary's circumstances").  The panel restated this 
obligation in the context of fiduciaries who counsel plan 
participants regarding the possible adoption of amendments to a 
plan: 
 we hasten to add that ERISA does not impose a 
"duty of clairvoyance" on fiduciaries.  An 
ERISA fiduciary is under no obligation to 
offer precise predictions about future 
changes to its plan. Rather, its obligation 
is to answer participants' questions 
forthrightly, a duty that does not require 
the fiduciary to disclose its internal 
deliberations nor interfere with the 
substantive aspects of the collective 
bargaining process.  A plan administrator may 
not make affirmative material 
misrepresentations to plan participants about 
changes to an employee pension benefits plan.  
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 See supra n.1.   
  
Put simply, when a plan administrator speaks, 
it must speak truthfully.   
 
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
 Given this obligation, PECO contended that the 
statements made by the benefits counselors were not affirmative 
misrepresentations, since company officials had not told them of 
the discussions taking place among senior management regarding 
the contemplated adoption of an early retirement incentive 
program.  The Fischer panel rejected this argument and reversed 
the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that, 
given the facts alleged, the plan administrator was responsible 
for statements made by the benefits counselors, and that PECO, 
which was plan administrator as well as plan sponsor, had 
therefore breached its fiduciary obligation to not affirmatively 
misrepresent material information to plan participants: 
 PECO argues that these communications cannot 
be characterized as "affirmative 
misrepresentations" because "when the 
benefits counselors . . . stated that they 
knew of no [early retirement] plan, their 
representations were correct." . . . This 
explanation will not do, for the fiduciary 
obligations owed to the plan participants 
were owed by PECo as plan administrator. 
These obligations cannot be circumvented by 
building a "Chinese wall" around those 
employees on whom plan participants 
reasonably rely for important information and 
guidance about retirement.  
 
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135 (emphasis omitted).  
 B. 
  
 While acknowledging that they had a fiduciary 
obligation as plan administrator not to materially misrepresent 
information regarding possible changes in PNG's pension plan, the 
present defendants contend that they have not violated this 
obligation since Burgunder was not a member of the Annuities and 
Benefits Committee and was not otherwise a fiduciary.  The 
defendants attempt to distinguish this case from Fischer, where 
the misrepresentations were allegedly made by benefits counselors 
who were the employees of the plan administrator, PECO.  In this 
action, the Annuities and Benefits Committee, and not PNG, is the 
named fiduciary, and hence, the defendants assert, they cannot be 
liable for any affirmative misrepresentations made to plan 
participants by Burgunder, PNG's employee, about possible changes 
to PNG's pension plan.  While we agree that Burgunder was not a 
member of the Annuities and Benefit Committee, and otherwise not 
a fiduciary of the plan, we cannot agree with the defendants that 
Burgunder was not acting on their behalf when speaking with 
Taylor. 
 The defendants concede that Burgunder had actual 
authority, as Supervisor of Employee Benefits, to advise 
employees of their rights and options under the plan, prepare 
reports concerning participants' benefits, and calculate the 
costs of alternative plan amendments on behalf of the plan 
administrator.  Appellees Br. at 21.  Given that Burgunder's 
activities are limited to these administrative ministerial 
functions, we agree with the defendants that Burgunder is not a 
fiduciary.  Department of Labor Regulation § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. 
  
§ 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 provides that such individuals, whose 
activities are limited "within a framework of policies, 
interpretations, rules, practices, and procedures made by other 
persons, fiduciaries with respect to the plan," cannot be 
individually liable as fiduciaries under ERISA, since they fail 
to exercise "the discretionary authority or discretionary 
control" over the plan required for the direct imposition of 
fiduciary liability.  See ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1002(21)(A) (West Supp. 1993).    
 While Burgunder is not himself a fiduciary with respect 
to the plan (and he is not a defendant in this action), he did 
function, under the regulations, as a non-fiduciary agent of the 
defendants, assisting them in discharging their authority and 
responsibility, as plan administrator, to "control and manage the 
operation and administration of the plan."  ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (1986).  While Burgunder is formally the 
employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the 
plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on 
behalf of the plan sponsor.  The conclusion that Burgunder 
performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the 
named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the 
regulations.  These provide that "[i]n discharging fiduciary 
responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on 
. . . persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such 
plan," such as "advising participants of their rights and options 
under the plan."  DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q 
& A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, 
  
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 12.06[4] (1993) (recognizing 
that, pursuant to DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, a committee, acting as 
plan administrator, can "select[] agents to perform ministerial 
functions").   
 The defendants concede, as we have noted, that 
Burgunder is governed by this regulation, and that he had actual 
authority as the Supervisor of Employee Benefits to "advise 
employees of their rights and options under the Pension Plan."  
Appellees Br. at 21.  This authority originates from the 
defendants, the plan administrator, and not from the plan 
sponsor, for the plan administrator is the entity with the 
fiduciary obligation to "control and manage the operation and 
administration of the plan."  ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
1102(a)(1) (1986).  In contrast, PNG, the plan sponsor, is not a 
fiduciary and correspondingly has no duty to administer the plan.  
Thus, under the applicable regulations, Burgunder was acting as a 
non-fiduciary agent of the defendants (the plan administrator) 
and not PNG (the plan sponsor) in "advising participants of their 
rights and options under the plan."  Department of Labor 
Regulation § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2.   
 This conclusion is consistent with our reasoning in 
Fischer, where we held that a plan administrator violates its 
"fiduciary obligations owed to the plan participants" when "those 
employees on whom plan participants reasonably rely for important 
information and guidance about retirement" make material 
misstatements regarding possible changes to a company's pension 
plan.  Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135.  The fact that the benefits 
  
counselors who made the misrepresentation in Fischer were the 
employees of PECO does not distinguish that case from ours.  The 
employees in Fischer were acting as the agents of PECO in its 
capacity as plan administrator, not as employer/plan sponsor.  
See id. at 133 ("As an employer, neither PECo nor its business 
decision to offer an early retirement program were subject to 
ERISA's fiduciary duties." (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Like the benefits counselors in Fischer, Burgunder was acting to 
assist the plan administrator, not the plan sponsor, in 
discharging its fiduciary obligation to "control and manage the 
operation and administration of the plan."  ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (1986).   
 C. 
 Having concluded that Burgunder was acting on behalf of 
the defendants, and not PNG, in performing the functions outlined 
above, we must consider whether Burgunder was acting within the 
scope of his authority as an agent of the defendants in making 
representations to Taylor regarding the possible retroactive 
application of plan amendments under consideration by PNG, the 
plan sponsor.  In making this determination, we are governed by 
the law of agency, as developed and interpreted as a matter of 
federal common law.  See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 99, 110, 109 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1989) ("[C]ourts are to 
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans."); Franchise Tax Board v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2854, 
n.26 (1983) ("`[A] body of Federal substantive law will be 
  
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and 
obligations under private welfare and pension plans.'" (quoting 
remarks of Sen. Javits at 129 CONG. REC. 29942)); National 
Football Scouting, Inc. v. Continental Assurance Co., 931 F.2d 
646, 648 (10th Cir. 1991) (examining whether "under the federal 
common law of agency" an agent of a plan fiduciary was acting 
within his actual or apparent authority).    
 In this regard, we recognize that implicit in our 
holding in Fischer is the assumption that in counseling the plan 
participants about possible amendments to the plan, the PECO 
benefits counselors were acting within their authority as agents 
of the plan administrator.  In particular, we read our limitation 
of fiduciary liability to "those employees on whom plan 
participants reasonably rely for important information and 
guidance about retirement" as a legal conclusion that such 
individuals operate, at a minimum, within their apparent 
authority to provide such information and guidance to plan 
participants, on behalf of the plan administrator.  The 
defendants here admit that Burgunder had actual authority to 
"advise[] employees of their rights and options under the Pension 
Plan."  Appellees Br. at 21.  Moreover, it is uncontested that 
plan participants reasonably relied on Burgunder for important 
information and guidance about retirement.  Considering these 
facts in light of the entire record, we conclude that, like the 
benefits counselors in Fischer, Burgunder was acting within his 
authority as an agent of the plan administrator, the members of 
  
the Annuities and Benefits Committee, in counseling plan 
participants regarding possible changes in the plan.    
 Our conclusion also accords with established principles 
of apparent authority.  It is well settled that apparent 
authority (1) "results from a manifestation by a person that 
another is his agent" and (2) "exists only to the extent that it 
is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to 
believe that the agent is authorized."  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 8 cmts. a & c (1958).  In our recent opinion in American 
Telephone & Telegraph v. Winback & Conserve Program, ___ F.3d 
___, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34398, 1994 WL 685911 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 
1994), applying the concept of apparent authority under the 
federal common law of agency, we held that "[a]pparent authority 
arises in those situations where the principal causes persons 
with whom the agent deals to reasonably believe that the agent 
has authority. . . ."  Id. at *64, 1994 WL 685911 at *18 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 It is uncontroverted that both elements necessary for 
the existence of apparent authority are present in this case.  
First, the defendants' undisputed vesting of Burgunder with the 
authority to "advise employees of their rights and options under 
the Pension Plan" clearly constitutes a manifestation that he was 
their agent.   
 Second, the plan participants, such as Taylor, 
reasonably believed that Burgunder specifically had the authority 
to counsel plan participants about possible amendments to the 
plan.  Taylor actually believed that Burgunder had the authority 
  
to counsel plan participants about possible changes in the plan.  
App. at 41b ("I accepted his comments because he's the key person 
in the retirement process at Peoples Natural Gas at the time I 
retired.").  Moreover, this belief was reasonable in that the 
evidence demonstrates that plan participants generally considered 
Burgunder the person to speak with regarding possible changes in 
retirement benefits.  In light of this reasonable belief about 
what information Burgunder was able to provide, the defendants' 
authorization of Burgunder to be their representative to plan 
participants, and the defendants' lack of effort to announce any 
limits to the scope of Burgunder's authority, it was a short and 
reasonable step for plan participants, such as Taylor, to believe 
that Burgunder not only was able, but indeed possessed the 
specific authority, to counsel them about possible amendments to 
the plan. 
 We conclude, therefore, that Burgunder was acting, at a 
minimum, with apparent authority as agent of the defendants in 
counseling Taylor regarding possible changes in the company's 
pension plan.  Given this authority, the defendants will be 
liable for any affirmative material misrepresentations made by 
Burgunder concerning the possible retroactive application of the 
plan's early retirement incentive plan. 
 D. 
 We therefore are presented with the question whether 
Burgunder's alleged statement to Taylor that "he believed that if 
an early retirement program was . . . offered . . . it might be 
retroactive," app. at 33b (emphasis supplied), constituted a 
  
material misrepresentation.  We agree with the Magistrate Judge 
that, as a matter of law, no reasonable fact-finder could 
conclude that Burgunder's statement constituted a 
misrepresentation.4 
 It is uncontested that at the time of Burgunder's 
statement to Taylor, the questions whether PNG would enact an 
early retirement incentive plan, and whether it would apply 
retroactively, were both yet undecided by PNG.  Given that the 
plan sponsor, PNG, had yet to make a final decision regarding the 
prospective amendment, we conclude that the defendants did not 
violate their fiduciary obligation by merely confirming to Taylor 
that the adoption of such an amendment was under consideration 
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 In addition to alleging that the defendants 
misrepresented material facts regarding the proposed amendment's 
retroactivity, Taylor contends that they breached an affirmative 
fiduciary duty to inform plan participants when possible 
amendments to an employee benefit plan are under serious 
consideration by the plan sponsor.  While we recognize that in 
certain instances a fiduciary has an affirmative obligation to 
disclose relevant material information to plan participants 
"about which the beneficiary has not specifically inquired," 
Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300, we do not believe that the facts of this 
case present this issue, and therefore we will not address it.  
During the time that Taylor made his decision regarding the 
effective date of his retirement, he was not ignorant of the fact 
that PNG was seriously considering an early retirement incentive 
plan.  Indeed, Taylor suggested in his own efficiency report that 
an early retirement incentive plan be instituted as a way to 
reduce his department's manpower, and he was aware through his 
discussions with the upper management of PNG that such a plan was 
under consideration.  Moreover, Taylor discussed with Burgunder, 
on multiple occasions, the likelihood of the company's enacting 
such an amendment to the plan, and he specifically reserved the 
right, in his letter of resignation, to change his retirement 
date from March 1, 1989 if such an amendment were enacted before 
that time.   
 
  
and by expressing a reasonable opinion as to the scope of the 
possible amendment.  The record clearly reflects that Burgunder's 
prediction was by all accounts reasonable.  Burgunder based his 
prediction on two grounds: (1) an outside consultant had 
suggested a retroactive early retirement program; and (2) a 
member of PNG's board of directors, Mr. Flinn, to whom Burgunder 
had talked about the amendment's possible scope, had stated that 
he supported making the program retroactive. 
 Burgunder's alleged statement is a far cry from the 
statements made by the benefits counselors in Fischer that "there 
was definitely nothing in the planning," when in fact such an 
amendment was under serious consideration by company officials.  
In contrast, Burgunder's attempt to counsel Taylor by offering 
his prediction based on his discussions with a member of PNG's 
board of directors was not a misrepresentation.  
 Taylor conceded that Burgunder's statement was nothing 
more than his "best guess as to what may occur should an early 
retirement package be adopted."  App. at 13a.  An honest 
statement of belief reasonably grounded in fact does not 
constitute a misrepresentation.  As Justice Holmes recognized in 
another context, "[t]he rule of law is hardly to be regretted, 
when it is considered how easily and insensibly word of hope or 
expectation are converted by an interested memory into statements 
of quality or value when the expectation has been disappointed."  
Deming v. Darling, 20 N.E. 107, 148 Mass. 504, 506 (1889). 
 III. 
  
 In sum, we conclude that although the defendants are 
responsible for any material misstatements made by Burgunder to 
Taylor regarding possible changes in PNG's pension plan, the 
statements allegedly made by Burgunder do not, as a matter of 
law, constitute a misrepresentation.  We will, therefore, affirm 
the order of the Magistrate Judge granting the defendants' 
request for summary judgment. 
 __________________________ 
Thomas H. Taylor v. The Peoples Natural Gas Company 
No. 94-3109 
 
Cowen, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I join in Parts I and IID of the majority opinion and 
therefore concur as to the judgment in this case.  I am unable to 
join in Parts IIA-C, however, because I believe that the 
majority's opinion sweeps more broadly than is justified under 
the facts presented here.  
 At issue in this case is a statement made by John 
Burgunder, The Peoples National Gas Company's Supervisor of 
Employee Benefits, to Thomas Taylor, a former employee of The 
Peoples National Gas Company ("PNG"), concerning the 
retroactivity of a potential amendment to PNG's pension plan.  
According to Taylor, Burgunder misrepresented to him that if PNG 
offered an early retirement incentive plan, Taylor would get its 
benefits even if Burgunder retired before the incentive plan was 
enacted.  Specifically, Taylor alleged that: 
 During and prior to the March 1st date, I had had 
discussions with Mr. Burgunder relative to rumors and 
possible studies that may have been going on that could 
  
lead to an early retirement program, and it was during 
one of those discussion points where I talked with Mr. 
Burgunder about other people that were retiring, and he 
gave me the -- he told me at that time that he believed 
that if there would be any early retirement programs 
offered in 1989, that they would make it retroactive to 
people retired from January 1st, until such time as 
they might offer the program. 
 
App. at 8b-9b (emphasis added).  He continued: 
 
 I can't recall exactly what his conversations were 
about the retroactivity other than he believed that if 
an early retirement program was announced or it was 
offered -- that might be a better word -- it might be 
retroactive to these people that we were talking about. 
 
App. at 33b (emphasis added). 
      As the majority correctly recognizes, the magistrate judge 
who adjudicated this case concluded that the statement made by 
Burgunder to Taylor that he believed the early retirement program 
would be retroactive did not constitute misrepresentation.  
Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., No. 92-394, slip op. at 4-5 
(W.D. Pa. January 27, 1994).  Agreeing with the magistrate judge, 
the majority holds in Part IID that as a matter of law, no 
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Burgunder's statement 
constituted a misrepresentation.  Maj. Op. at     [typescript at 
18].  Inexplicably, however, before disposing of this case on the 
unassailable grounds aptly set out by the magistrate judge, the 
majority chooses in Parts IIA-C to pose and answer its own 
questions about the relationship between ERISA fiduciaries and 
their agents in cases, unlike the case at hand, where a party 
  
demonstrates a misrepresentation.  The majority concludes that a 
plan administrator can be held liable for a breach of a fiduciary 
duty for misrepresentations by the plan administrator's non-
fiduciary agents.  Because the majority reaches out to decide an 
issue that is not squarely before us, I am unable to join in 
Parts IIA-C of the majority opinion. 
 It is well settled law that in general "[c]ases are to 
be decided on the narrowest legal grounds available, and relief 
is to be tailored carefully to the nature of the dispute before 
the court."  United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (quoting Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1275 (5th 
Cir. 1975));  see also In re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R, 
772 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1985) (it is an "elementary maxim of 
our legal system" that a court should decide "only the case 
before it"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S. Ct. 1265; 
Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees of Insts. of Higher 
Learning, 620 F.2d 516, 524 (5th Cir. 1980) (expressing concern 
that cases be decided on the narrowest legal grounds available); 
Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (explaining 
that courts do not decide hypothetical controversies).  This 
proposition is a corollary to the rule that federal courts are 
not to render advisory opinions, but rather are to decide 
specific issues for parties with real disputes.  See, e.g., 
Korioth, 523 F.2d at 1274-75; see also United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 963, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3447 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
  
concurring) ("[W]hen the Court goes beyond what is necessary to 
decide the case before it, it can only encourage the perception 
that it is pursuing its own notions of wise social policy, rather 
than adhering to its judicial role."). 
 The statements the majority makes concerning the 
possible liability of ERISA fiduciaries due to misrepresentations 
of their non-fiduciary agents run afoul of this rule because the 
majority's holding that there was no misrepresentation here is 
sufficient to put this case to rest.  Moreover, the majority's 
choice to explore agency law is particularly ill-advised because 
(1) we have not had the benefit of the magistrate judge's 
thinking and findings on these important matters, (2) these 
issues were neither argued nor briefed by counsel, and (3) the 
majority breaks considerable new ground in the area of ERISA 
fiduciary liability. 
 The majority's opinion states that the Annuities and 
Benefits Committee of the System Pension Plan, the plan 
administrator and co-defendant in this matter, can be held liable 
for statements by Burgunder because Burgunder was acting within 
the scope of his apparent authority as an agent of the plan 
administrator in making representations to Taylor.  The opinion 
of the magistrate judge disposing of this case, however, is 
completely devoid of any references to the question of whether an 
ERISA fiduciary can be held liable for statements of its non-
fiduciary agents acting within the scope of their apparent 
  
authority.  Indeed, in his opinion, the magistrate judge reaches 
only two conclusions of law.  First, he concludes that there is 
no general duty on the part of an employer to inform its 
employees of any action it is considering taking in the future.  
As he states, "[t]he fact that PNG was considering an early 
retirement package for 1989 is not information which ERISA 
requires an employer to disclose."  Taylor, slip op. at 3 
(emphasis added).  Second, he concludes that since "[p]laintiff 
concedes that he was not informed that a decision had been made 
to offer any early retirement program at all, and that this was 
simply Mr. Burgunder's best guess as to what may occur should an 
early retirement program be adopted," there was "no 
misrepresentation, and thus no breach of fiduciary duty."  Id. at 
4-5.  There is absolutely no discussion of the position now 
advanced by the majority that the plan administrator could be 
held liable for statements of the plan administrator's non-
fiduciary agents.5 
                     
     
5Accordingly, footnote one of the majority opinion is 
slightly misleading when it first states that "[t]he Magistrate 
Judge granted PNG's motion for summary judgment on this claim 
concluding that, under the circumstances, PNG was not subject, in 
its capacity as plan sponsor, to ERISA's fiduciary obligations" 
and then draws the conclusion that "Taylor's claim of fiduciary 
breach is properly limited in this case to the plan 
administrator."  Maj. Op. at     [typescript at 4].  While it is 
certainly accurate to explain that PNG, the plan sponsor, is not 
a fiduciary, the majority's footnote makes it appear as if the 
magistrate judge drew the distinction between the duty of an 
employer as a plan sponsor and the fiduciary duty of the 
Annuities and Benefits Committee as a plan administrator.  
Indeed, the magistrate judge did not even distinguish between the 
  
 Even more importantly, the magistrate judge's factual 
recitation and the record before us are insufficient to establish 
the precise nature of the relationship between the System Pension 
plan administrator and Burgunder, a failing that makes it 
extremely difficult to perform a careful analysis of the possible 
applicability of the apparent authority doctrine.  PNG asserts 
that Burgunder was merely an employee of PNG and was not a member 
of the "separate and distinct plan administrator."  Appellee's 
Brief at 21.  The magistrate judge's factual recitation does not 
even touch on the relationship between Burgunder and the plan 
administrator.  As the majority recognizes, "apparent authority 
arises in those situations where the principal causes persons 
with whom the agent deals to reasonably believe that the agent 
has authority."  Maj. Op. at     [typescript at 16] (citing 
American Telephone & Telegraph v. Winback & Conserve Program, No. 
94-5305, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 34398, at *64, 1994 WL 685911, at 
*18 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 1994)).  The majority, however, fails to 
adduce a single fact which convincingly demonstrates that the 
plan administrator caused employees of PNG to conclude that 
Burgunder was authorized to make representations to employees 
concerning potential plan amendments.6  Accordingly, I am 
                                                                  
plan sponsor and the plan administrator in the discussion section 
of his opinion.   
     
6The majority states that Taylor's belief was reasonable 
because "evidence demonstrates that plan participants generally 
considered Burgunder the person to speak with regarding possible 
changes in retirement benefits."  Maj. Op. at     [typescript at 
  
troubled by the majority's analysis and concerned with the logic 
of deciding a question without relevant facts. 
 Equally disturbing in this case is the majority's 
willingness to advance arguments that were not put forward by the 
appellant in the first instance and that were not briefed by the 
parties.  We have repeatedly recognized the impropriety of 
reaching issues that are not properly briefed before us.  United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1057 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied,     U.S.    , 114 S. Ct. 699 (1994); 
Francesconi v. Kardon Chevrolet, Inc., 888 F.2d 18, 19 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1989); H. Prang Trucking Co. v. Local Union No. 469, 613 
F.2d 1235, 1239 (3d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. 
                                                                  
17] (emphasis added).  In support of this proposition the 
majority cites a portion of the deposition testimony of Taylor, 
App. at 22a, and a portion of the deposition testimony of 
Burgunder, App. at 39a-40a.  In the portion of Taylor's testimony 
that the majority cites, Taylor simply recounts his feeling that 
most people "felt comfortable" dealing with Burgunder concerning 
their retirement.  Taylor never makes the claim that others felt 
comfortable relying on Burgunder's statements about potential 
plan amendments.  Further, in the portion of Burgunder's 
testimony that the majority cites, Burgunder merely testifies 
that he had discussed "rumors" of a new retirement program with 
employees. 
 As a preliminary matter, it is difficult to understand how a 
discussion of "rumors" could give rise to a reasonable belief 
that Burgunder could authoritatively speak to the issue of plan 
amendments.  Even more importantly, it is hard to comprehend how 
the majority can rely on statements by Burgunder, the alleged 
agent, to conclude that the principal (i.e., the plan 
administrator), made a representation to the employees that 
Burgunder could speak authoritatively about possible amendments.  
What the majority lacks is a statement by the plan administrator, 
the principal, disclosing that Burgunder could give advice 
concerning potential plan amendments.   
  
Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 293 (7th Cir. 1988) (expressing concern 
over decisions based on issues not refined by the fires of 
adversary presentation).  In his opening brief, Taylor simply 
argued that a fiduciary may not materially mislead a plan 
participant.  Appellant's Brief at 11.7  Moreover, in his reply 
brief, Taylor makes it clear that his argument is that PNG is a 
fiduciary and it owed the fiduciary duty of conveying complete 
and accurate information to him.  Appellant's Reply Brief at 2.  
Taylor states, "PNG continues to assert its status as employer 
only, to which the Appellant disagrees. [sic]."  Id. at 1.  Since 
the majority apparently agrees that PNG is not a fiduciary, see 
Maj. Op. at     n.1 [typescript at 4 n.1], it is difficult to see 
how Taylor's arguments make it necessary to discuss the plan 
administrator's possible liability due to statements by non-
fiduciary agents.  Taylor never specifically pressed on appeal 
the claim that because the plan administrator is a fiduciary, it 
should be liable for statements of its non-fiduciary agents.  
Accordingly, counsel for PNG and the Annuities and Benefits 
Committee had no occasion to evaluate this issue in their 
                     
     
7Taylor also argued that (1) an employer has an affirmative 
duty to inform its employees of any action it is considering 
taking in the future, and (2) that there are insufficient facts 
in this record to resolve certain disputed issues.  The first 
argument is disposed of by the majority opinion at footnote 
three.  The second argument becomes irrelevant once we conclude 
that there was no misrepresentation.   
  
briefs.8  Without proper argument and discussion of this issue, 
it is ill-advised to reach such claims. 
 Finally, the majority's decision to reach the issue of 
a plan administrator's liability for non-fiduciary agents is ill-
advised because the majority's conclusion is not firmly dictated 
by our previous precedents.  The majority states that the 
conclusion it reaches is consistent with our reasoning in Fischer 
v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied,     U.S.    , 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993).  In Fischer, 
however, we merely held that "[a] plan administrator may not make 
affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants 
about changes to an employee pension benefits plan."  Fischer, 
994 F.2d at 135.  We did not comment on the possible liability of 
a plan administrator for statements by its non-fiduciary agents.  
While the majority's position may be a logical extension of 
Fischer, I would have left our decision as to whether such an 
extension is justified to another day when the issue is more 
squarely presented.  Accordingly, relying simply on the fact that 
Taylor failed to demonstrate misrepresentation in this case, I 
would affirm the decision of the magistrate.    
 
                     
     
8PNG does argue, by way of an alternative grounds to affirm 
the magistrate's decision, that PNG is not a fiduciary and that 
Burgunder is not a fiduciary.  It does not, however, reach the 
question of whether Burgunder could bind the plan administrator 
as a non-fiduciary agent. 
  
                        
